Assessing the level of independence
of NATIONAL ANTICORRUPTION CENTER (CNA)

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS – Anticorruption Agencies
Transparency International
1. The risk of abuse or partisan activities may be minimized if the appointment mechanism would
ensure the general support of the person appointed by the Parliament, unlike the Government,
and is there would be a reporting mechanism outside the Government (for instance, a
parliamentary sub-committee with the representation of all the major parties). A weak point
of many legislative schemes seems to be the situation when the President (or any political
personality) holds too much control on appointments and operations within the
Anticorruption Agency. The President is the chief of the executive power, and the members of the
executive power also may yield to temptation. In this case, the President could face a difficult
decision to prosecute his/her close political colleagues.

2. It is therefore important that the appointment procedure be one which recognizes that the task of the
office holder will be to maintain a check on the Executive and, in particular, the political party in
power. If the Executive or even the ruling party were to have a free hand in making the
appointment, there would be an immediate loss of practical effectiveness and of public
confidence. At best, appointees would risk being seen as hand-picked supporters who could be
relied upon not to rock the boat. At worst, they would be seen as the partys hatchet men. It
follows that the appointment procedure must be one which involves a broader cast of actors
than those presently in power.

3. The precise appointment procedure will vary from country to country, but each should address the
issue of whether the proposed mechanism sufficiently insulates the appointment process. It
must be one which ensures that an independent person of integrity is likely to be appointed,
and that such a person is adequately protected while in office. The office-holder should also be
afforded the same rights of tenure of office as those enjoyed by a superior court judge. Removal
from office should never be at the discretion of the powers that be, but only in accordance with a
prescribed and open procedure, and only on the grounds of incompetence or misbehavior.1

4. Special care must be taken in appointment procedures, and in guaranteeing security of tenure
for those at the top levels of the Agency, to ensure that only those enjoying wide public
confidence hold these positions. More than this, particular attention has to be paid to monitoring
the performance of officers at all levels within the Agency. However, just as an Anti-Corruption
Agency can be susceptible to those at the highest levels of government, it can also be used as a
weapon with which to persecute political opponents. Even where the independence of the office is
respected and an Agency is able to operate freely, it occupies extremely difficult terrain.2
1 Page 97, Chapter 11. Independent Anticorruption Agency, Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a
National Integrity System, Transparency International, TI Source Book, 2000,
http://www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook.
2 Page 103, Chapter 11. Independent Anticorruption Agency, Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a
National Integrity System, Transparency International, TI Source Book, 2000,