Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 1[EN]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 2[EN]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 4[EN]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 3[EN]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 1[RO]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 2[RO]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 4[RO]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 3[RO]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 1[RU]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 2[RU]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 4[RU]
Dintre Neglijenţă, Rea Intenţie şi Oportunităţi Ratate: Analiza Manifestaţiilor din 6-7 Aprilie 2009 Partea 3[RU]
Negligence, Malice and Missed Opportunities: Deep Analysis of the Demonstrations and Protests of 6 and 7 April 2009
A number of findings and
conclusions confirm the hypothesis that the leadership of the law enforcement
bodies acted knowingly to undermine the ability of these bodies to maintain
public order. This behavior intentionally deteriorated the peaceful nature of
demonstrations. The quality of decision-making had been undermined by the
failure to establish operation headquarters. As a result, decision-making was
de facto unipersonal. Decisions were made without a rational and substantiated
assessment and evaluation of the situation. Such signs are visible at every dimension
of the authorities’ obligations. Therefore, the performance of police
authorities requires a thorough investigation to elucidate the causes of these actions.
The study examined in detail
two hypotheses regarding police behavior. They are as follows: hypothesis 1 – negligence,
inadequate skills and professionalism; and hypothesis 2 – deliberate actions to
undermine the peaceful nature of demonstrations. Our conclusion is that
although some persons in charge, some units of the police and security forces,
and especially some simple police officers exercised their functions in good
faith, sometimes having insufficient knowledge and equipment, the political
leaders, top leadership, and some managers acted deliberately to undermine the
peaceful nature of the demonstrations and deliberately thwarted the efforts of
dealing with the situation and are therefore fully responsible for the disaster
that occurred.
The role of instigators and aggressive persons has not been fully elucidated, even in this report. We believe that some of these instigators acted with the consent of the police, so they played the role of a back line to degrade peaceful demonstrations. There is at least some circumstantial evidence in this regard. Specialized authorities can shed light on this, including the Ministry of Interior and the Information and Security Service. The role of some enraged segments uncontrolled by authorities certainly had the effect of multiplying aggression. But the effect of multiplying aggression would not have been possible without the inaction of authorities.
